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RECALIBRATING THE WAR ON TERROR BY
ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
KEVIN J. FANDL*
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism has existed in various forms for hundreds of years.
Only recently, with the attacks on the United States, Spain, and the
United Kingdom, has the awareness of terrorism in the Western
world intensified. While attacks considered terrorist-based occur on a
surprisingly frequent basis, these three attacks stand out prominently
as the starting point for a new era in global relations.
Terrorist attacks are detrimental to the political, financial and
social economy, both locally and globally. Such attacks force a
greater percentage of public funds to be diverted to national defense.
Accordingly, those funds cannot be used to directly benefit the
economies of the world. Identifying methods to secure a reduction in
the frequency of terrorist attacks is, therefore, in the best interests of
all States that benefit from the global economy.
The United States was attacked in 2001 by a group of terrorists
hailing largely from Saudi Arabia.1 The alleged mastermind behind
the attack, Osama bin Laden, was said to be stationed in Afghanistan
2
shortly thereafter. In retaliation for the attack, the United States
sought to strengthen United Nations Security Council sanctions
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1. See Paul Salopek, Terrorism Finds Foot Soldiers in Saudis, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2001, at
C1.
2. See Edward Cody & Molly Moore, Bomb Kills Four Afghan Civilians, WASH. POST,
Oct. 10, 2001, at A14.
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against Afghanistan3 and, after Afghanistan’s refusal to extradite
Osama bin Laden to the United States, took military action to find
4
and bring bin Laden to the United States for trial.
The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan was authorized by
5
the United Nations and began in 2002, leading to the overthrow of
the Taliban government. Bin Laden remained at large. In a collateral
effort to democratize the country, the United States spearheaded the
implementation of a new government in Afghanistan to fill the void
left by the removal of the Taliban.6 Combat operations continue to
this day in Afghanistan as pro-Taliban forces attempt to regain ruling
7
power.
In 2003, the United States intensified its efforts to reduce the risk
of terrorist attacks by preemptively striking targets in Iraq under the
belief that Iraq was harboring nuclear weapons and possibly Al
8
Qaeda terrorists. Unlike the war in Afghanistan, international
support was severely limited for this invasion.9 After invading, the
United States captured the former leader, Saddam Hussein, and again
10
implemented a new form of government.
The U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been justified
by the current administration as measures necessary to reduce
11
terrorism. This justification, however, gives rise to several important
3. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Continues Sanctions Against
Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida Organization, Taliban, U.N. Doc. SC/7274 (Jan. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2002/sc7274.html (discussing Resolution
1390, which extended sanctions against the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan).
4. See David L. Greene & Tom Bowman, U.S. Lashes Back, BALT. SUN, Oct. 8, 2001, at
1A.
5. See William C. Smith, Legal Arsenal: International Law Can Be an Important Element
in the United States’ Campaign Against Terrorism, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at 42, 44.
6. See generally UNITED STATES AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
USAID/AFGHANISTAN STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-2010 (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/
locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/Afghanistan_2005-2010_Strategy.pdf.
7. See Tom Regan, Violence Increasing in Afghanistan, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0117/dailyUpdate.html.
8. See George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (discussing Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction and ties with terrorists in his explanation for the U.S. attack on Iraq).
9. See Allison Ehlert, Iraq: At the Apex of Evil, 21 BERK. J. INT’L L. 731, 757-66 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Use of Force and Arms Control: Turmoil in Iraq, Transitional Agreements,
and the Capture of Saddam Hussein, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 190-93 (2004); see also Dilip Hiro,
Iraq: Life after the Constitution, Oct. 20, 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.Article?id=6395.
11. See George W. Bush, Speech on Promoting Democracy (Oct. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7472/speech_on_promoting _democracy.html [hereinafter Bush
Speech on Promoting Democracy].
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questions. Is military intervention in the Middle East the most
effective method for reducing the possibility of terrorist attacks? Are
efforts at regime change in the Middle East decreasing the number of
terrorist attacks on foreign targets? Finally, is forced democratization
an effective and sustainable method for curtailing terrorist attacks?
This Article begins with an exploration of the literature
surrounding the U.S.-led war on terror. Part I examines justifications
for the war by considering the claim that democratization yields
economic development and then examines whether there is a link
between forced democratization and a reduction in terrorism. Part II
sets forth the research questions to be answered in the analysis of this
literature and data. Part III briefly describes the methodology to be
used in answering the research questions. Part IV analyzes at length
the assertions that democracy is related to a reduction in terrorism
and to economic growth. Finally, the Article concludes that the war
on terror is leading to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks
against foreign targets and that sustainable development practices
would be more effective in curtailing terrorist proliferation.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Linkage Between Democracy and Economic Growth
Current foreign policies in the West have not often formally
recognized the need for greater work toward democracy in the
Middle East. President Bush recently spoke about this at the United
Nations, claiming that democracy “requires building the institutions
that sustain freedom.”12 Yet the freedom of which President Bush
spoke is the same freedom that he contends will “change the
13
conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit[.]” This link
between spreading democracy and suppressing terrorism is a major
14
justification for the war being waged in the Middle East.
The democratization process in the early United States, largely
an internal rather than external process, evolved over a long period of

12. George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting (Sept.
14, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050914.html
[hereinafter Bush Address to the U.N.].
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2006,
at 62.
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time and involved numerous challenges to its efficacy.15 Substantial
inequalities among states, a civil war, and discriminatory voting
practices in U.S. history make it clear that democracy does not
develop easily. Rejections of liberal democracy from Iraq to
Venezuela to Indonesia are a reflection of the fact that the benefits of
democracy are often delayed beyond the threshold of citizen
patience. Amy Chua of Yale Law School finds that the basis for this
disenchantment may lie in the fact that the market democracy
promoted by the West is not the same as that practiced by the West.16
David Gillies reviewed the evidence supporting linkages between
17
democracy and development and found it “ambiguous, at best.” He
found that, instead of promoting democracy, encouraging good
governance could yield more productive results for development:
If the relationship between democracy and economic development
is empirically open-ended and indirect, at best, then donors may
need to consider how their democracy, rights and governance
programs are justified. Instead of an “all good things go together”
approach, donors could consider less lofty approaches that focus on
the enabling conditions for growth and development. These
include promoting accountability, transparency, and a predictable
18
set of rules to govern economic interactions and public policy.

Fareed Zakaria contends that building a democracy is a long-term
process, and that we should refrain from anticipating final results
19
while still in the initial stages. He distinguishes democracy from
“constitutional liberalism” by defining democracy as the process of
selecting governments, and constitutional liberalism as the protection
of liberty through rule of law.20 In other words, it is constitutional
liberalism, not the democratic process, that protects a people from
authoritarian government and preserves the freedom to act.
Zakaria’s conception of constitutional liberalism involves not only
traditional democratic values, but also individual liberty, rule of law,
and freedom from coercion.21
15. See The People’s Road: American Democracy, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 88 (book
review).
16. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 13 (2003).
17. David Gillies, Democracy and Economic Development, in IRPP POL’Y MATTERS, Apr.
2005, at 8, 21.
18. Id. at 24.
19. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME
AND ABROAD 156 (2003).
20. Id. at 18-19.
21. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. July/Aug. 1997, 22,
25–27 (“[Constitutional liberalism is] the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to
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Elections have been held in both Afghanistan and Iraq since the
United States intervened. The high voter turnout and seemingly
legitimate process was hailed by the international community as a
success.22 But do elections signify stability or progress? Jane Boulden
contends that “[e]lections act as a functional indication of a milestone
in the peace process, providing the international community with
evidence of change. They are not, however, reliable indicators of real
23
progress, in either democratization or the establishment of peace.”
Terry Lynn Karl at Stanford argues that merely holding elections
does not constitute a sign of regime change; they must be fair and
open and accompanied by the “liberalization of authoritarian rule”
and the creation of a civil society. “Equating democracy with the
mere holding of elections or assuming that such elections will
subsequently generate further and deeper democratic reforms down
24
Referring to
the line commits ‘the fallacy of electoralism.’”
Zakaria’s notion of illiberal democracies, Karl warns that “excessive
minimalism,” including superficial changes in leadership, elections,
and new constitutions and policies, may in fact be simply a shift from
25
one type of autocracy to another.
Francis Fukuyama examines the linkage between democracy and
economic development by comparing once popular ideas of rigid,
authoritarian institutional reforms with modern movements toward
democracy as “an object of development in itself and a means toward
26
Fukuyama finds democratic countries often
economic growth.”
perform better in times of political and economic crises due to their
greater degree of legitimacy and stability; however, he finds a weak
empirical relationship between democracy and development, arguing

protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source—state,
church, or society. The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws
on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is
constitutional because it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”).
22. See Afghanistan Officials Call Election a Success (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 19, 2005)
(transcript on file with the author); EU Delegation Calls Afghan Elections “Free, Fair and
Transparent”, BBC MONITORING INT’L REP., Sept. 19, 2005.
23. Jane Boulden, Democracy and Peace-Building, IRPP POL’Y MATTERS, Apr. 2005, at
29, 43.
24. Terry Lynn Karl, From Democracy to Democratization and Back: Before Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule, CDDRL WORKING PAPERS, Sept. 2005, at 3, 7 (emphasis omitted)
(internal citations omitted).
25. Id. at 8.
26. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY 28 (2004).
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there is little support for either authoritarian or democratic rule as
27
consistent with growth.
Mahmood Monshipouri suggests that democracy is not only
disconnected from economic development, but that it also may lead
to worsening economic situations. For example, in examining the
deregulation and privatization of firms in Latin America,
Monshipouri contends that poverty has increased, inequalities have
28
grown wider, and crime has risen as a result of democracy.
Arunabha Bhoumik, writing in the Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy, recently postulated that the war on
terror is ignoring the underlying causes of terrorist proliferation and
29
thereby “exacerbating the terrorist threat.” These underlying causes
30
are certainly worth examining, but the key to understanding why
terrorist activity continues to intensify may have more to do with the
exacerbating factors of military intervention.
B. Forced Democratization and Terrorist Proliferation
Jason Brownlee of the Stanford Center on Democracy,
Development and the Rule of Law, contends that forced
democratization and foreign state building fail to recognize the
rigidity of local institutions and the potentially detrimental responses
31
Using the example of U.S. intervention in Central
of locals.
America, Brownlee points out that military intervention failed to
develop a single true democracy in the region—Costa Rica is the only
Central American nation to form a democracy, and the United States
never intervened there.32 Brownlee concludes that in order for
foreign intervention to succeed, it must be “downsized not
33
He suggests that “[t]he failures of imposed regime
supersized.”
change lead to the conclusion that indigenous gradual political
development—with all of its potential for authoritarianism and civil

27. Id.
28. Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating
Developing Countries, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25, 31 (2001).
29. Arunabha Bhoumik, Democratic Responses to Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the
United States, Israel, and India, 33 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 286 (2005).
30. See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror
Without the War, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 587 (2004).
31. Jason Brownlee, Imperial Designs, Empirical Dilemmas: Why Foreign-Led State
Building Fails, CDDRL WORKING PAPERS, June 2005, at 10.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 34.
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unrest—could be the optimal path for sustainable democratization
34
and statebuilding.”
In a comprehensive and thought-provoking new book, World on
Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred
and Global Instability, Amy Chua of Yale University Law School
postulates that free markets and democracy favor market-dominant
minorities at the expense of competing ethnic groups, creating
35
envious factions and hatred. Interestingly, Chua draws attention to
the fact that the type of democracy being promoted by the West is
significantly distinct from the type of democracy that exists in
developed countries today.36
The long-term, often difficult
democratization model utilized by the West has been replaced by the
quick-fix package of democratization exported to many developing
countries today. The sustainability of recent democratization efforts
by the West remains to be seen.
F. Gregory Gause III recently argued in Foreign Affairs that the
answer to the Middle East violence problem may not lie in immediate
democratization but rather in long-term solutions that require regular
U.S. assistance.37 He refers to the 2003 State Department report,
Patterns of Global Terrorism,38 and concludes that over half of the
2003 terrorist attacks in non-free countries occurred in Iraq and
Afghanistan, despite the heralding of recent elections in both of those
countries.39 He asserts that foreign intervention in its current
manifestation may not be achieving its goal of reducing terrorist
40
attacks.
Thomas Carothers suggests that the idea of democracy
promotion as a solution to Islamic fundamentalism is “badly
41
oversimplified and potentially misleading as a policy credo.” He
finds that the Middle East is generally skeptical of Western efforts to
democratize their region, and the leaders believe that “democracy

34. Id. at 37.
35. CHUA, supra note 16, at 9.
36. Id. at 13.
37. F. Gregory Gause III, Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct.
2005, at 62, 74-76.
38. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 (2004) [hereinafter
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM].
39. Gause, supra note 37, at 66.
40. Id. at 63.
41. Thomas Carothers, Democracy’s Sobering State, 103 CURRENT HIST., 412, 415 (2004),
available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/CurHistTC.pdf.
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would likely unleash radical forces that could be harmful to both the
42
region and the West.”
The cultural makeup of the Middle East may also be contributing
to the poor prospects for democratization and a reduction in violence
against foreign forces. Jane Boulden argues that, where a significant
gap exists between an outsider, market-dominant minority and a
poor, destitute majority, democratization can act as an opportunity
for the poor to “take back” what is rightfully theirs. “Rather than
being conducive to peace, therefore, democratization can contribute
43
to conflict.”
Jennifer Moore argues that the problems of poverty and
underdevelopment in the Middle East have been compounded by the
war on terror, and that the substantial reliance on military force as
opposed to alternative means of fighting terrorism “potentially feeds
44
ongoing conflicts rather than repressing them.” The poverty and
underdevelopment that existed in the Middle East prior to recent
foreign intervention may have been exacerbated by the military
actions against Afghanistan and Iraq.
Some members of the international community, while supportive
of U.S. efforts in the war on terror in many respects, believe that the
war is actually increasing terrorism. A 2004 Pew Research Center
study that surveyed French and German attitudes toward the war on
terror found that a majority of people “believed that the Iraq war had
undermined the struggle against terrorists and doubted the Bush
45
Lakdhar
Administration’s sincerity in trying to combat terror.”
Brahimi, the United Nations Special Envoy to Iraq, stated in April
2004 that “there is no military solution to the problems [in Iraq], and
that the use of force, especially the excessive use of force, makes
46
matters worse and does not solve the problem.”
Daniel Benjamin, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and Steven Simon of Georgetown University
recently asserted that the U.S. invasion of Iraq increased the number

42. Id. at 416.
43. Boulden, supra note 23, at 36.
44. Jennifer Moore, Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal
Framework for Coordinated Action to Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 43, 43 (2004).
45. Susan Sachs, Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2004, at A3.
46. John F. Burns, Iranians in Iraq to Help in Talks on Rebel Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2004, at A1.
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of Jihadists, thereby increasing the long-term threat of terrorism.47 “It
is simply no longer possible to maintain that the United States is
48
winning the war on terror.” They find that military intervention is
often a poor preventative measure against terrorism because the
49
military is ill-equipped to address the modus operandi of terrorists.
The idea of democratizing the Middle East is good, they suggest, but
unlikely to succeed without the social, economic, and demographic
50
conditions necessary for sustainability. They conclude that broad
reforms and a stronger international coalition are the most effective
solution to the current quagmire.51
Democracies are few and far between in the Middle East.52
Among the non-democratic countries, attempted transitions to
democracy have largely resulted in a nebulous state between
authoritarianism and democracy. Elections are often held with the
winner already decided, only partial privatization has been
implemented, and measures taken to appease the international
community have been mere gestures.53 In her recent book, Terror in
the Name of God, Jessica Stern argues that democracy is not the most
effective way to fight terrorism. She suggests that popularly elected
parties in some countries are sympathetic to terrorist actors. To
support this, she posits the examples of Algeria, where the Islamic
party took power democratically after a drop in oil prices; Pakistan,
where the Islamic party that considers the Talibanization of Pakistan
a priority, took substantial parliamentary seats in the 2002 election as
a result of the Pakistani government’s support for the war on terror;
and Turkey, where an Islamic party took 363 of the 550 parliamentary
seats in the 2002 elections.54

47. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE
WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT xiv (2005).
48. Id. at 126.
49. Id. at 198.
50. Id. at 200.
51. Id. at 197-208.
52. According to the Freedom in the World 2005 index, of the eighteen Middle Eastern
countries identified in that index, seventeen are partly or completely not free (Israel being the
single exception). FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2005 (2005), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005.
53. See, e.g., THOMAS CAROTHERS & MARINA OTTAWAY, The New Democracy Initiative,
in UNCHARTED JOURNEY: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 3, 8 (2005);
ZAKARIA, supra note 19, at 98-99.
54. JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD 287-88 (2003).
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Fighting this growth in Islamic fundamentalism might be done
more effectively through enhanced development practices that allay
these inequities, provide the anticipated benefits of democracy, and
offer alternative outlets to voice grievances. Research suggests that
citizens disgruntled with a lack of equality and social services are
more likely to explore non-democratic outlets for change, including
terrorism, if they live within an autocracy, a faltering neo-liberal
55
democracy, or a fragile developing democracy.
Groups that target the West for their ills grow more powerful
politically and economically as a result of this rise in dissatisfaction
with democracy. Violent Western-led responses to terrorist attacks
against foreign targets have tended to increase support for terrorist
groups. For instance, the United States’ violent military response to
the terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa was ironically cause
for celebration among terrorists, as it motivated disparate groups to
band together; the U.S action unwittingly strengthened the terrorist
56
movement.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
Although wars are often accompanied by elaborate plans of
attack and engagement, as well as clear targets and goals, the war on
terror is conspicuously absent of any of these.57 It might be said that
the goal of the war effort is a significant reduction in terrorist activity,
since complete prevention is unrealistic. Reducing the possibility of
terrorist attacks would certainly restore a layer of global security that
has begun to erode. Accordingly, with this goal in mind, plans can be
derived and measured in terms of how likely they are to achieve this
goal. Recent efforts led by the United States to reduce terrorist
proliferation have involved regime changes, bombing campaigns,
occupation, and most recently, forced democratization.
How
successful are these efforts at reducing the possibility of terrorist
attacks? Are they having the intended impact on the target
population?
The null hypothesis to be tested in this research Article can be
stated as follows: forced democratization of the Middle East, that is,
55. See, e.g., Carlos Fortin, Officer-in-Charge, United Nations Conference on Trade &
Development [UNCTAD], Statement to the United Nations Economic and Social Council:
High-Level Segment (Jun. 29, 2005), http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/meetings/2005/hl2005/
Fortin.pdf.
56. STERN, supra note 54, at 289.
57. See, e.g., BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 47, at 186-87.
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democratization accompanied by military or other threatening means
(measured by type and level of Western involvement in the Middle
East), will reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks against foreign
targets. Accordingly, a rise in the level of foreign involvement in the
operation of a Middle Eastern State should result in a decreased
number of terrorist attacks against foreign targets, either in the
country of involvement or abroad.
In the alternative, this Article suggests that increased foreign
military involvement in the Middle East is not positively correlated
with a decreased number of terrorist attacks against Western targets.
Further, based on the limited evidence gathered, this Article proposes
that increased foreign military involvement in the Middle East is in
fact leading to an increase in the likelihood of terrorist attacks on
foreign targets.
This hypothesis will be tested by examining foreign engagement
in the Middle East using statistical data primarily gathered from the
World Bank, the U.S. Department of State, Freedom House, and the
National Counterterrorism Center.
III. METHODOLOGY
Hostilities in the Middle East inhibit the collection of a
comprehensive set of data that would best serve the analytical goals
of this Article. For example, a complete survey might include current
levels of terrorist activity and proliferation across the Middle East,
concentration of foreign troops across Iraq and Afghanistan, and
updated numbers of foreign contractors operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, existing data on levels of U.S. troop
involvement in Iraq, the number of terrorist attacks on foreign
targets, and the number of significant regional attacks by Islamic
terrorist organizations, prove to be strong indicators of the progress
being made in the Middle East. These indicators enable reasoned
conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be made.
Data expressing a linkage between terrorist activity and U.S.
involvement in the forced democratization of the Middle East are
calculated by comparing the type and level of Western involvement in
the Middle East with the number of terrorist attacks led by Islamic
militants in all parts of the world and the level of coalition troop
fatalities. The resulting data reveal a significant rise in the number of
worldwide terrorist attacks and coalition troop fatalities since the
U.S.-led invasion and forced democratization of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT
PRACTICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Throughout the Middle East, there is significant support for the
idea that U.S.-led imperialists are imposing their Western values,
58
economics, and politics on an otherwise stable and peaceful society.
In the United States, the belief espoused by the Bush Administration
is that democracy is a necessary and lacking institution in the Middle
East that will keep the West safe from terrorism.59 Yet stories
throughout Western newspapers report that terrorist attacks are on
60
the rise and that the death toll in the “war on terror” is growing. In
the Middle East, tensions are growing rapidly, and discontent with
American occupation is leading new terrorist cells to emerge in
response.61 The question then becomes, is the U.S.-led effort to stunt
terrorism with democratization having the reverse effect? Is the war
on terror creating more terror?
A. Linkage between Democracy and a Reduction in Terrorism
In Iraq, the Bush Administration openly pursued a strategy of
“regime change” as its motivation for war because the regime was
withholding necessary information regarding its nuclear weapons
62
After invading and discovering no such weapons,
proliferation.

58. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 45 (discussing the recent Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press poll showing a high degree of ill will and distrust for foreign interveners in
the Middle East); Steven A. Cook, The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2005, at 91 (concluding that while democracy is welcomed in the Middle East,
militarized delivery of democracy is resisted).
59. See Bush Speech on Promoting Democracy, supra note 11 (discussing the long-term
security that will result from democratization of the Middle East).
60. See, e.g., Tom Regan, Global Terror Attacks Tripled in 2004, Apr. 28, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0428/dailyUpdate.html (discussing the dramatic increase in the
number of terrorist attacks in 2004); Michael A. Fletcher, 2000th Death Marked by Silence and a
Vow, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2005, at A13 (reflecting on the more than 2,000 U.S. soldiers that
have died in Iraq hostilities); Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.net/ (last visited
March 27, 2006) (suggesting that at least 37,000 civilians have died since the start of the Iraq
war).
61. See Mike Boettcher, Al Qaeda Forming New Cells Worldwide, Jul. 31, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/31/al.qaeda.super.cells/ (describing the spread of terrorist
“super cells” across North Africa and Southeast Asia).
62. See John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 563 (2003)
(citing President George W. Bush’s 2002 speech before the United Nations in which he justified
“the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council
resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security”).
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fighting terrorism became the central focus.63 This was a logical next
step since terrorists had largely overrun Iraq after the existing regime
was removed and stood in the way of the Administration’s efforts to
establish a democratic system of governance.64
The view taken by the United States, that forced democracy will
eliminate terrorism, is limited in international support.65 In the Arab
world, ruling elites do not favor the use of democracy to eliminate
66
Islamic extremism. As one scholar put it, “democracy—imported at
the tip of an M-16 rifle—is looking less and less appealing to many
67
Arabs.” The story is the same in the non-Arab world where support
for the invasion was weak and support for the occupation weaker.68
Regime change is a goal that is distinct and incompatible with the
goal of reducing terrorism. In order to achieve some semblance of
success with regime change, an intervener must play party politics by
69
working with the various social and ethnic groups within a country.
This includes working with extremist groups that may find an outlet
in the democratic process (at least initially). “Especially in violent
settings, democracies are not built by democrats alone and they are
not always built by democratic means.”70 Poor strategic planning and
coordination may result in an unsustainable democracy as well as a
71
rise in terrorist activity.
More than two years have passed since Iraq was invaded and a
stable, legitimate government has not yet been established. A
constitution was prepared and an interim ruling parliament elected,
but these are merely icons of a system that has no roots in the Middle
East. They are symbolic to the democratic world because they mirror
staple democratic mechanisms in the West. However, these events,
63. See Bush Aides Defend War, CBS NEWS, Mar. 14, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/03/18/iraq/main607182.shtml.
64. See Bush Address to the U.N., supra note 12.
65. See Yochi J. Dreazen, U.N. Report Extols Democracy for Mideast but Criticizes U.S.,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A4 (discussing a recent U.N. report finding that democratic values
are essential for the region but that the U.S. efforts are “complicating efforts to bring those
values about”).
66. Carothers, supra note 41, at 416.
67. Cook, supra note 58, at 96.
68. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 45.
69. See CHUA, supra note 16, at 274 (arguing that the United States must not promote
“unrestrained, overnight majority rule” where market dominant minorities exist but rather
should ensure judicial and constitutional safeguards to allow for the gradual development of the
democratizing country).
70. Karl, supra note 24, at 33.
71. Id.
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while important, are not indicative of a sustainable, lasting, or
peaceful democracy.
The level of foreign troop involvement in Iraq is reflective of the
role that outsiders play in Iraqi daily life. U.S. troops patrolling
streets and performing regular raids of potential terrorist locations
give the impression that the occupiers are in control of Iraqi security.
Although coalition troop levels have decreased slightly overall since
the start of the war, the number of U.S. troops has remained
72
The
relatively constant over time, albeit subject to fluctuation.
number of coalition troop fatalities, however, has increased since the
start of the war, totaling over 2,000 to date (see Table 1, below).

Table 1a: Terrorist Attacks on and Fatalities of
Coalition Troops in Iraq by Year (2003-2005)
IRAQ
73
Troop Level (Coalition)
74
Number of Fatalities
Percent of Total

2003
160,505
579
0.36%

2004
159,250
905
0.57%

2005
169,400
897
0.53%

Table 1b: Troop Levels and Fatalities of Coalition Troops in
75
Afghanistan by Year (2002-2005)
IRAQ
Troop Level (Foreign)
U.S. Military Fatalities
Percent of Total

2002
10,900
60
.55%

2003
14,800
12
.08%

2004
26,480
43
.16%

2005
27,371
75
.27%

72. Note that the number of coalition troops has remained approximately 23,000, while the
number of U.S. troops ranged from a low of 115,000 in February 2004 to a recent high of
160,000 in December 2005. The most recent data shows 133,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq in
February 2006. See IRAQ INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN
POST-SADDAM IRAQ (Brookings Institution, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 30, 2006, at 20,
http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex [hereinafter IRAQ INDEX].
73. Id. The troop levels given above are average figures calculated from the monthly data
provided in the Index.
74. See Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, http://www.icasualties.org/oif (last visited Mar. 18,
2006).
75. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AFGHANISTAN INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF
RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN POST-TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN 4-6 (2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/projects/southasia/afghanistanindex.htm.
The troop
levels given above are average figures calculated from the monthly data provided in the Index.
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Table 2: Number of Daily Attacks
76
by Insurgents in Iraq by Year (2003-2005)
IRAQ
Number of Daily Attacks
Number of Coalition Fatalities
Average Number of Fatalities per Attack

2003
142
437
3.08

2004
587
905
1.54

2005
855
894
1.05

The table below represents the number of significant terrorist
attacks annually from 1998 through 2004.77 In 2004, however, the
Bush Administration chose to withhold this statistical information to
avoid giving the impression that the United States was losing the war
on terror.78 The members of the U.S. Congress subsequently
pressured the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) to release
the actual 2004 statistics, which they did (see Table 3).
79

Table 3: Significant Terrorist Attacks (1998-2004)
Year
Number of Attacks

1998
274

1999
395

2000
426

2001
355

2002
198

2003
190

80

2004
651

76. See IRAQ INDEX, supra note 72, at 5, 7-8, 22. Data for Afghanistan insurgent attacks is
not currently available.
77. The actual number of total attacks is significantly higher (over 2,000 in 2004). Note
that these numbers do not include the Iraqi civilians killed as a result of the war on terror, which
the Brookings Institution estimates to be rising and around the level of 8,073–14,400 as of
August 2005. See id. at 10.
78. See Susan B. Glasser, U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism, WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 2005, at A1.
79. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 38, at 176.
80. Terrorist attack data is not available from the State Department for 2004; the 2004 data
displayed here was retrieved from the National Counterterrorism Center. See NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
FOR 2004 81 ( 2005), available at http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/NCTC_Report.pdf.
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Table 4: Terrorist Attacks by Region
81
(1998-2003) (Significant and Non-Significant)
Africa

Asia

North
America

Middle
East

Western
Europe

Eurasia

Latin
America

1998-2003
Total
Casualties

5,839

5,273

4,459

2,222

453

743

297

1998-2003
Total
Attacks

171

458

6

172

213

93

725

34.15

11.51

743.17

12.92

2.13

7.99

.41

Average
Casualties
per Incident

The type of foreign involvement in the Middle East is highly
indicative of the anticipated scope of response by opposition forces.
By 2003, coalition forces in Iraq had shifted their attention to market
stabilization,82 and by 2004-2005, they were focused on
83
democratization. The United States led the establishment of a new
Iraqi Council in July 2003, which announced major market-oriented
reforms in Iraq two months later.84 Much of the year was spent
stabilizing oil pipelines to spur production and subsequent export
85
income for Iraq. In November of that year, the United States took
over the former United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. In
2004, the focus shifted toward the democratization of Iraq: June 2004
saw the official transfer of sovereignty from the U.S. Coalition
Provisional Authority to the interim Iraqi government, which was
followed by the official election in January 2005.

81. Id. at 177-78.
82. See, e.g., ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, IRAQ ENERGY CHRONOLOGY:
1980- NOV. 2005 (2005), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/iraqchron.html [hereinafter IRAQ ENERGY
CHRONOLOGY] (indicating that in 2003, all sanctions against Iraq were lifted, up to 90% of oil
wells were secured by coalition forces, and Iraq’s leadership council announced free market
reforms, permitting 100% foreign ownership of all sectors other than natural resources).
83. See, e.g., id. (discussing the transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional
Authority to an interim Iraqi government in June, 2004).
84. See John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of the Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Financial
Reconstruction in Iraq (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/
20040212_taylor.html (discussing anticipated economic reform of Iraq’s banking sector,
currency, international debt and frozen assets).
85. For a chronology of oil-related events in Iraq, see IRAQ ENERGY CHRONOLOGY, supra
note 82.
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The type of United States’ involvement in Iraqi affairs shifted
from military engagement, to market stabilization (primarily through
86
oil infrastructure protection), to democratic reform (through
sovereignty transfer, elections, and the attempt to draft a
87
This process—from war to democracy—coincided
Constitution).
with an increase in U.S. troop fatalities and an increase in worldwide
terrorist attacks. While direct conclusions warrant substantially more
data, which are currently unavailable due to the volatile situation in
the region, a positive relationship can be seen between the type and
level of involvement of foreign occupiers and the resulting level of
terrorist activity.
B. Why Democracy Cannot Precede Effective Development in the
Middle East
Immediate results are central to a policy of forced
democratization. When Afghanistan held elections in 2004, the Bush
Administration hailed this as a shining moment in their newly
established democracy.88 The same enthusiasm accompanied the
transfer of power to the Iraqi interim authority in 2004 and the
89
elections in 2005. But regardless of whether these steps are a sign of
democratic reform, they most certainly are not a reflection of the
establishment of a legitimate, sustainable democracy. Democracy
takes time to grow and develop, much like any social change. The
literature reviewed indicates that an approach that counts on rapid
democratization through military force is more likely to experience
substantial cost-overrun and extended periods of engagement in the
host country than an approach that fosters sustainable development
while planting the seeds of democracy.
Promoting successful democracy as a rapid development will
have two detrimental effects. First, citizens of the intervening country
who wish to see a peaceful Middle East will initially support the
intervention, but their support will wane once the costs of

86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Bush Speech on Promoting Democracy, supra note 11 (arguing that the
United States will gain long-term security if it promotes democracy in the Middle East); Bush
Address to the U.N., supra note 12 (calling for elections and the building of institutions in Iraq).
88. Leta Hong Fincher, The Roots of Terrorism (Voice of America English Service radio
broadcast Dec. 9, 2004) (transcript on file with author).
89. Michael White & Ian Black, Iraq: The Handover: Bush and Blair in Sync as NATO
Told of Transfer, THE GUARDIAN, June 29, 2004, at 4; see also Peter Baker & Robin Wright, In
Iraqi Vote, White House Sees Vindication Of Its Course, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at A11.
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intervention begin to mount without any significant progress being
made toward peace in the Middle East. Second, the citizens of the
host country may also be convinced that democracy will bring them
the rapid benefits and growth seen in post-World War II Europe,
East Asia, or other successful democratic transitions. When these
benefits fail to materialize quickly, dissatisfaction with the intervening
country will grow, and the citizens will be more likely to retaliate
against the country’s forces.
Democracy must be promoted as a long-term, slow-growth
process with no expectation of yielding significant economic returns
in the short-run. Peace and stability will result from the strengthening
of institutions, independent judiciary, and effective administration of
the government. Rule of law, regulatory reform, and educational
investment, as well as other necessary sustainability factors, do not
spontaneously arise from elections or a constitution; they require
long-term capital investments and internal collaboration with
90
minority and majority parties.
Democracies with nascent or transitional democratic structures,
such as those in Latin America, are facing significant challenges to
their sustainability when immediate anticipated benefits do not
materialize. The long process of democratization, much like that of
economic development, is a fragile, nurture-dependent process that
yields limited returns, if any, in its formative years. Arguing that
democracy is a justifiable basis for intervention, the solution to
violent insurgency, and the goal for peace, is unrealistic and
dangerous as a public policy.
Democracy can work in the Middle East, but it cannot take root
in infertile soil. Democracies tend to promote values, such as
freedom of speech and religion, the right to privacy and selfdetermination, that do not coincide with those found in most Middle
Eastern States. These are fundamental democratic values that do not
have any history in the Middle East.91 But this is not to say that they
cannot be sown.
Clearly, “[p]reconditions matter a great deal for the survivability
92
of democracy but not for the transition to it.” Democratization
90. See generally Gause, supra note 37.
91. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Middle East and North Africa: Human Rights
Developments, in WORLD REPORT 2001 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/
mideast/index.html.
92. Karl, supra note 24, at 11 (emphasizing the need to address human agency and the
strategic calculations of actors to promote sustainable democracy).
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throughout the developing world has succeeded where reform efforts
began by developing the capacity to sustain an open, heterogeneous
93
society. Institutions must be established to guide the transition to
democratic rule.94
Forceful intervention followed by coercive
democratization tactics rather than collaboration with the
governments of the Middle East solidifies an image of the United
States as an imperialist power that does not recognize the unique
95
needs and goals of each society.
Democracy-building takes time. Free elections and a draft
constitution are a small step in the right direction; however, the steps
that should have preceded these events are largely absent. As a
result, the move toward democracy in Iraq is leading to increased
separatist inclinations, which have existed since the unification of
96
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul and which seem unlikely to cease in the
near future.
C. Economic Growth and Sustainability
The values promoted by democracies are separated from those
of Islamic regimes by a broad chasm, and the bridge connecting the
two sides is paved with effective development policies. This Part will
describe those policies and explain how they can lead to democracy in
the Middle East.
During the Wilsonian era, the United States broadly promoted
democratization as an effort to modernize nations and establish a
97
The goal was the
global community of like-minded politicians.
establishment of a peaceful trading community wherein all countries
could leverage their competitive advantage for the greater good of
the world. The theory postulates that the key factors of democracy,
93. Id. at 8.
94. See Cook, supra note 58, at 91 (suggesting that democracy did not take hold in the
Arab world due to the existence of flawed institutions).
95. See Ibrahim M. Oweiss, Egyptian Example Shows Need for Homegrown
Democratization in the Middle East, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.washington-report.org/archives/April_2005/0504034.html.
96. See, e.g., Judith S. Yaphe, War and Occupation in Iraq: What Went Right? What Could
Go Wrong?, 57 MIDDLE E. J. 381, 383-84 (2003) (discussing the political picture in early
twentieth century Iraq); see also Fareed Zakaria, What Bush Got Right, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14,
2005, at 22 ( “[T]he end of the old order [in Iraq] has produced growing tendencies toward
separatism and intolerance.”).
97. See Jeffrey A. Frieden & David A. Lake, International Relations as a Social Science:
Rigor and Relevance, 600 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 136, 142 (2005); see generally
TONY SMITH, AMERICA’S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE
FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994).
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such as free elections, free press, and legitimate constitutions, were
essential to the growth of the world’s economies and the development
98
of a global market. While this theory appears logical, data suggests
that there is only a weak correlation between democratization and
development and between open markets and growth.
Although Wilson was unsuccessful in achieving a world of
peaceful trading nations as he had envisioned, several of his
successors have made efforts to complete the task, including, most
99
The Bush Administration invaded
recently, George W. Bush.
Afghanistan with the support of the United Nations Security
100
Council and with the intention of pursuing those responsible for the
September 11 attacks in the United States.101 A collateral effect of
their invasion was the removal of the Taliban government. Once it
became clear that the United States would be unable to capture the
alleged aggressors, it turned its attention to the democratization of
Afghanistan. Now, more than three years after the invasion, the
country is quickly falling into civil war and is rife with corruption and
crime.102 In Iraq, the story is even more disheartening for democracy.
With every step toward political stabilization, retaliation grows
103
Why did democratization efforts fail in Afghanistan and
fiercer.
Iraq when the Marshall Plan met such great success with post-World
War II Germany and Japan? Why is democracy promotion in the
Middle East yielding such unremarkable results?
The argument that democracy is essential for economic growth,
th
prevalent since at least the late 20 century, can be countered with
one simple word: China. But this is not the only example—Vietnam,
Equatorial Guinea, and Cambodia join China in ranking among the
top twenty countries in terms of annual GDP growth in the last ten
years, and not one of them has been designated as completely free by
Freedom House (see Table 5). These cases of non-democratic
economic growth challenge the assumption that democracy is
98. See, e.g., Frieden & Lake, supra note 97, at 141-45 (discussing the theory of
“democratic peace” and the relationship between trade policy and international politics).
99. See, e.g., Bush Speech on Promoting Democracy, supra note 11 (“I believe that
America will gain long-term security by promoting freedom and hope and democracy in the
broader Middle East.”).
100. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc
S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
101. See, e.g., Greene & Bowman, supra note 4.
102. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 7; Taleban Leader Promises “Unprecedented Waves of
Afghan Resistance”, BBC MONITORING INT’L REP., Mar. 16, 2006.
103. See supra Tables 1-4.
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essential for economic development. This type of “extraordinary
economic success has presented a serious problem for those arguing
that democracy is necessary for development or that dictatorial
regimes cannot produce sustained economic development.”104
Table 5: Annual GDP Growth (%) for
105
Twenty Top Performing Countries
Freedom

Country Name

House
Ranking

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

14.26

29.14

71.19

21.91

41.45

20.80

85.90

36.60

15.60

9.60

29.70

22.90

106

(2005)

Equatorial Guinea

Not Free

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Partly
Free
Partly

Liberia

Free

-4.27

12.12

106.28

Rwanda

Not Free

35.22

12.75

13.85

8.86

7.58

Turkmenistan

Not Free

-7.20

-6.70

-11.30

6.70

16.46

China

Not Free

10.50

9.60

8.80

7.80

7.10

Myanmar (Burma)

Not Free

6.95

6.44

5.65

5.87

10.95

Ireland

Free

9.86

8.07

11.09

8.64

11.28

6.90

5.87

3.32

7.34

3.30

4.30

7.10

11.10

12.63

7.54

Partly

Armenia

Free
Partly

Mozambique

Free

Maldives

Not Free

8.82

11.52

9.30

7.78

Angola

Not Free

10.40

11.20

7.90

6.80

3.24

Chad

Not Free

0.81

2.40

4.30

5.90

-0.60

Vietnam

Not Free

9.54

9.34

8.15

5.76

4.77

Partly

Uganda

Free

11.52

9.07

5.10

4.91

7.88

Azerbaijan

Not Free

-11.80

1.30

5.80

10.00

7.40

104. Carothers, supra note 41, at 415.
105. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DATABASE (2004),
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline [hereinafter WDI ONLINE]. Note that, while many of
developing countries exhibit a rise in annual GDP, income per capita has fallen as a result of
higher rates of population growth. Id.
106. FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 52.
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Bhutan

Not Free

6.84

5.49

7.78

7.07

7.00

Cambodia

Not Free

6.89

4.97

6.82

3.68

11.17

8.90

9.10

-10.20

12.70

10.10
2.88

Partly

Albania

Free
Partly

Georgia

Free

2.60

11.20

10.52

3.10

Country Name

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

10-Year
Average

Equatorial Guinea

1.47

1.45

17.62

14.70

9.98

22.32

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

5.60

4.50

3.90

2.70

4.70

18.99

Liberia

20.40

4.90

3.30

-31.00

2.00

16.63

Rwanda

5.97

6.72

9.38

0.96

3.66

10.50

Turkmenistan

18.59

20.43

19.83

16.92

17.00

9.07

China

8.00

7.50

8.30

9.30

9.50

8.64

Myanmar (Burma)

13.75

9.70

N/A

N/A

N/A

8.47

Ireland

10.08

6.19

6.92

3.70

4.90

8.07

Armenia

6.00

9.56

13.19

13.91

10.10

7.95

Mozambique

1.52

13.00

7.40

7.10

7.76

7.95

Maldives

4.39

3.26

6.08

8.40

8.80

7.59

Angola

3.01

3.14

14.35

3.45

11.21

7.47

Chad

-0.60

9.90

9.90

11.30

31.00

7.43

Vietnam

6.79

6.89

7.04

7.24

7.50

7.30

Uganda

5.38

6.10

6.84

4.73

5.73

6.73

Azerbaijan

11.10

9.90

10.55

11.20

11.20

6.67

Bhutan

7.00

7.00

6.68

6.70

4.90

6.65

Cambodia

6.99

5.56

5.47

5.35

6.00

6.29

Albania

7.30

7.60

4.70

6.00

6.20

6.24

Georgia

1.83

4.79

5.48

11.09

8.51

6.20

To yield economic growth and to pave the way for democratic
reform, sustainable development must be at the top of developing
countries’ agendas. This involves more than fundamental economic
growth—it includes essential types of capital that push economies
from agrarian or industrial-based towards efficient, knowledge-based
economies. With a sufficient concentration of these essential forms of
capital, a democratic base begins to form upon which international
institutions can more effectively promote democratic growth.
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Key indicators of the potential for effective sustainable
development suggested by the World Bank include: (1) Financial
Capital; (2) Physical Capital; (3) Human Capital; (4) Social Capital;
and (5) Natural Capital.107 Together, these indicators comprise the
foundation on which any society can move toward achieving
sustainability and eventual democracy. Development programs that
fail to address these basic elements are less likely to successfully
achieve sustainable development and thereby to lay the economic
foundation for democratic growth.108
Recent sustainable development reports suggest that successful
109
Financial
development programs involve a “portfolio of assets.”
capital is an indicator of macroeconomic planning and fiscal
110
management, while raw labor, social and human capital, and the
quality of institutions are considered intangible capital.111 Intangible
capital is a concept that captures assets that are not recorded in
standard wealth estimates, offering new insights into the inequalities
between developing and developed countries. “For example, if an
economy has a very efficient judicial system, clear property rights,
and an effective government, the effects will be a higher total wealth
and thus, an increase in the intangible capital residual.”112
The primary assets of intangible capital are human capital (the
skills and knowledge of the labor force), social capital (trust of the
people in a society) and governance (efficient judicial system,
113
property rights and an effective government). With these factors at
the forefront of development projects, sustainable growth becomes
achievable.
In order for developing countries to invest in capital growth for
sustainable development, excess income in the form of savings must
be generated. Savings rates vary across countries, but they are
indicative of development in low-income countries.114 They are also
107. World Bank, Sustainable Development in the 21st Century, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTESSDNETWORK/0,,conte
ntMDK:20502659~menuPK:1287775~pagePK:64159605~piPK:64157667~theSitePK:481161,00.h
tml (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Sustainable Development].
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WHERE IS THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: MEASURING CAPITAL
FOR THE XXI CENTURY xix (2005).
110. Sustainable Development, supra note 107.
111. WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 17 n.1.
112. Id. at 87.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 71-83.
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significantly tied to macroeconomic policy, which can affect the
ability to both generate and protect income in the form of savings,
and to invest in intangible capital, such as education. Savings rates as
a portion of GDP are shown in Table 6 below.
TABLE 6a: Adjusted Net Savings Rates115 (Top Ten and Bottom Ten)116
Country
Name

10-Year
Average
(1994-2003)

Singapore
117

36.98%

Maldiyes
Botswana
China
Eritrea
Republic
of
Korea120
Luxembourg
Honduras
Haiti

35.33%
32.30%
29.69%
26.29%

Malaysia

22.24%

24.57%
24.40%
23.84%
23.10%

Country Name

10-Year
Average
(19942003)

Syrian Arab
Republic
Uzbekistan
118
Tonga
119
Kazakhstan
Saudi Arabia
121
Angola

-14.41%

Nigeria
Oman122
Republic of the
Congo
Azerbaijan

-15.83%
-18.22%
-19.47%
-26.66%
-21.47%
-25.55%
-27.97%
-30.88%
-39.64%

115. Adjusted Net Savings, also called “genuine savings,” is a more accurate predictor of
sustainability because it includes measurements such as human capital and changes in natural
resources. See WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 37.
116. WDI ONLINE, supra note 105 (using the series “[a]djusted net savings, excluding
particulate emission damage (% of GNI)”). Note that some savings rates are negative,
reflecting excess government spending.
117. Data for Maldives is not available for 1994.
118. Data for Tonga is not available for 2002 or 2003.
119. Data for Kazakhstan is not available for 1994.
120. Data for the Republic of Korea is not available for 1994.
121. Data for Angola is not available for 1995.
122. Data for Oman is not available for 2003.
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TABLE 6b: Adjusted Net Savings Rates by Region
Region
East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
United States
Latin America & Caribbean
Europe & Central Asia124
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East & North Africa

10-Year Average (19942003)
25.86%
13.36%
7.85%
7.53%
4.65%
1.50%
-6.40%

Table 6b is particularly telling of the unsustainable and declining
125
wealth available within the Middle East. Wide dispersions of wealth
in the region prohibit the equal access to education that is seen in
126
Asian and European regions. When combined with the substantial
rise in the population of young people throughout the Middle East
that is anticipated, 127 this limited educational investment could lead to
a reversal in the development progress made thus far.
According to the World Bank, intangible capital accounts for
128
roughly 75% of the world’s total wealth. Developing countries that
face high levels of poverty and unemployment are more likely to have
low levels of intangible capital—that is, less technology investment,
more capital flight, and more emigration of the educated citizenry.
The result is a country that cannot sustain growth and provide for the
basic needs of its people.
Economic stability and growth are fundamental requirements for
sustainable democracy. As described above, democracy requires
solid institutions of civil society, and a sufficient level of social capital

123. WDI ONLINE, supra note 105 (using the series “[a]djusted net savings, excluding
particulate emission damage (% of GNI)”).
124. Data for Europe & Central Asia is not available for 1994.
125. See WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 36 (“Negative genuine savings rates imply that
total wealth is in decline; policies leading to persistently negative genuine savings are
unsustainable.”).
126. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
THE ARAB HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003 139 (2003) (“Grossly unequal distributions of income, wealth
and power adversely impact opportunities for knowledge acquisition by undercutting
sustainable economic growth.”).
127. See Onn Winckler, The Demographic Dilemma of the Arab World: The Employment
Aspect, 37 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 617, 617 (2002).
128. See WORLD BANK, supra note 109, at 26.
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to spur economic growth. Democracy is unsustainable in countries
that lack significant intangible capital, maintain high poverty and low
growth rates, and have savings rates too low to allow substantial
investment in capital growth.129
CONCLUSION: RECALIBRATING THE WAR TO AVOID
PROMOTING TERRORISM INSTEAD OF DEVELOPMENT
“[I]n the case of the United States, the threat to the State comes
not from terrorism, but the response to terrorism.”130 Whether the
impetus for the U.S.-led war on terror in the Middle East was the
pursuit of terrorists or preventive warfare, the result has been an
attempt at forced democratization. The question that policymakers
should be asking is whether this effort is having an effect on terrorist
proliferation and, if so, whether that effect is positive. The signs that
terrorist activity in democratic countries is increasing are evident, but
is there a correlation between this increasing activity and current
democratization efforts?
The data presented in this Article indicate there is a positive
correlation between Western efforts to forcefully democratize the
Middle East and the level of terrorist activity against foreign targets.
In addition, the literature suggests that there is a comparatively weak
relationship between democracy, rapid economic development, and
peace. From these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn.
The extent and sufficiency of the United States’ preparation for
its wars with Iraq and Afghanistan have been hotly debated and
extensively analyzed. However, more important is the United States’
lack of preparation for sustaining a peaceful transition process from
authoritarian regimes to democracies in these countries. The United
States merely ensured that symbolic democratic mechanisms were in
place—no other plan for continued support and development was
established prior to engaging in the regime change process.
Rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II involved “several
years of intensive advance planning . . . and training of key
administrators, both military and civilian, with the organization ready
to be put in place immediately [after] the surrenders of the defeated

129. See, e.g., BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 47, at 200 (suggesting that democracy is a
good plan for the Middle East, but that it is unsustainable unless substantial reforms are
undertaken first).
130. Bhoumik, supra note 29, at 309.
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states had been made.”131 This planning is largely absent from the
present plan to reconstruct the Middle East.
The spread of democratic political and economic values to the
developing world should focus on fostering civil society institutions,
rather than elections and multiparty democracy. Alex Seita claims
that globalization should be configured to promote the values of
liberal democracy and that Western democracies should “be able to
132
However, he
determine the specific content of globalization.”
warns that the perception of the West as political and economic
imperialists will not foster support for democratizing efforts. Thus,
the “primary vehicle for the industrialized democracies should be the
‘rule of law[.]’”133
A key issue in the struggle against terrorist proliferation is the
threat of failed states. Crumbling democracies or those that could not
get off the ground, weak autocracies that are run by interest groups,
and governments too weak to provide basic social services are prime
havens for terrorist growth and development.134 Some recognition of
this fact has led the Bush Administration to begin training more
troops in Africa to fight the potential locus operandi of terrorist
groups.135 However, when a nation embarks on a campaign to change
the regime of a State, but fails to establish effective measures to
sustain growth and development before initiating a campaign to
change the regime of another State, it leaves the door open for a
resurgence of terrorist activity. Afghanistan is a prime example.
After the 2001 destruction of the Taliban ruling party, the United
States declared victory and moved on to Iraq.136 This shortsightedness has led to deterioration of security in the country and the
137
The citizens of Afghanistan “remain
rise of more Taliban forces.
131. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE
INVASION OF IRAQ IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: OPINIONS ON THE EMERGING
NEW WORLD ORDER SYSTEM 82 (2004).
132. Alex Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429,
432 (1997).
133. Id.
134. See generally Susan E. Rice, The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POL’Y BRIEF (Brookings Institution, Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2003.
135. Morning Edition: United States Increasing Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa (NPR
radio broadcast March 8, 2004) (on file with author).
136. See, e.g., Bush: Afghanistan Is a Victory over Terrorism, June 15, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/15/karzai/ (“Coalition forces, including many brave Afghans,
have brought America, Afghanistan and the world its first victory in the war on terror[.]”).
137. See Gunmen Kill Candidate in Sunday’s Afghan Elections, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005,
at A17; Regan, supra note 7.
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desperately poor and essentially ungoverned, scarcely better off then
138
they were on September 10, 2001.”
Forced democratization of a developing country followed by
minimal sustainable development practices will not achieve any
reduction in overall terrorist activity, and in fact may make the world
a less safe place in which to live. Collaborative, effective and
sustainable development practices are needed to achieve success in
the democratization process of the Middle East. Leadership for this
process must come from inside the Middle East, rather than from
139
A recent Article in the Middle East Journal
foreign imposition.
stated this need as follows: “Development depends on a political
version of bio-diversity, in which democracy emerges organically out
140
of existing local traditions and practices.”
Steven Cook, director of an independent task force of the
Council of Foreign Relations, concluded that “it’s better to promote
democracy and manage [the risk that unfriendly governments will
result] than to do nothing and continue to face the same kinds of
problems in the region that we currently face: political alienation,
141
He also suggests that one
extremism, and, ultimately, terrorism.”
way in which the United States can promote democracy in the region
is by linking political reform to aid. In this way, “[w]e can actually
reward countries with aid if they do the right thing on political
reform.”142
Cook does not address any possible alternatives to forced
democratization, but one exists that may result in long-term stability
and significantly less loss of life. Effective development offers a
solution that can provide a remedy to terrorist proliferation, a
collaborative institutional growth approach, and eventually,
organically developed democracy.
Ignoring this solution is
detrimental to development and peace in the region and worldwide.
Tying aid to political reform, much like the new U.S. Millennium

138. STERN, supra note 54, at 294 (concluding that Iraq citizens are in the same situation).
139. See, e.g., Oweiss, supra note 95, at 34 (noting that “reform is a historical and cultural
process that must be homegrown”).
140. Jeremy Jones & Nicholas Ridout, Democratic Development in Oman, 59 MIDDLE E. J.
376, 376 (2005).
141. Bernard Gwertzman, Cook: Washington Should Support “Basic Democratic
Principles”, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., June 9, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8177/
cook.html.
142. Id.
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Challenge Corporation is doing,143 prevents effective development
from taking hold in a country by ignoring several long-term
144
In
institutional growth processes necessary to sustain democracy.
essence, with aid tied to political reform, growth will be limited by the
amount of real and superficial external changes a country is able to
make, without paying heed to the key institutional development and
other key reforms that the country should make. Countries may
focus their efforts on satisfying the demands of Western grant-making
institutions’ ideas of political reform at the expense of some of the
most critical internal developmental reforms.
One might conclude from reading this Article that there remains
no workable solution to the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Yet, while this text is intended to evaluate ideas about the best way to
promote democracy in the Middle East from this point forward, there
are still options remaining for Iraq and Afghanistan worthy of brief
mention.
The United States has placed itself in a difficult position. If it
leaves troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to root out terrorists and
facilitate electoral politics, violence will likely worsen in retaliation to
the “imperial” occupation, and fatalities and costs will continue to
rise. If the United States pulls troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan, a
power vacuum will emerge and either civil war will break out or
extremist factions will take power, reversing the limited progress that
has been made to this point.145 Additionally, a growing number of
Americans subscribe to the idea that the war on terror may be leading
to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, reflecting the need
for policy support at home as well as abroad.146
To resolve this quagmire, several steps must be taken. First,
global support must be sought. The United States is the primary

143. See generally THE OTHER WAR: GLOBAL POVERTY AND THE MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE ACCOUNT (Lael Brainard et al. eds., 2003).
144. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 26, at 37 (“The MCA [Millennium Challenge Account]
may stimulate countries well on the road to reform, but it will do little for failed states and the
world’s more troubled countries.”).
145. See, e.g., Andrew F. Krepinevich, How to Win in Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005,
at 87.
146. According to a Roper Center 2005 survey, 41% of surveyed Americans thought that
the war in Iraq has led to an increase in the risk of further terrorist attacks in the United States.
Survey by Pew Research Center and Princeton Survey Research Associates International, October
6-October 10, 2005. Retrieved March 5, 2006 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
ipoll.html.
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occupying force in both Iraq and Afghanistan and arguably entered
Iraq without justification in international law. The occupation has
already cost over $300 billion and thousands of Iraqi and American
lives.147 Working together with committed, well-funded international
partners will have two effects—it will substantially reduce the costs
borne by the United States and allow for higher concentrations of
forces in areas where citizens are at risk, and it will counteract the
perception that America is the sole imperial power in the region.
Garnering international support at this point may be difficult and it
will involve significant bargaining on the part of U.S. diplomats. In
order for the international community to get on board, the U.S.
strategy in the region must change and collaboration with the United
Nations must increase.
Rather than pursuing a policy of military dominance over
extremist elements, the focus of the U.S. military in the region should
shift to one of development protection.
The institutional
development that needs to take place—establishing laws, a viable
constitution, an independent judiciary—requires support and
protection. The structures required to build social capital, likewise
require support. For example, schools, including trade schools and
universities, must be built, and those students pursuing education and
training there must be protected. Also, jobs need to be created,
employing the masses and providing regularized salaries for potential
sympathizers to extremist elements.148 These must not be subsidiary
roles of the U.S.-led forces, but primary ones. Failed efforts to build
sustainable institutions can substantially deride support for
democracy in the region.149 The growing sentiment throughout the
Middle East is that the United States is not sincerely interested in
150
This shift in strategy toward enhancing
democratic reform.

147. Steven Kosiak, The Cost of US Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through
Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond, UPDATE (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
Wash., D.C.), Jan. 4, 2006, available at http://www.csbaonline.org (follow “latest from CSBA”
hyperlink; then follow “The Cost of US Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through
Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2006); see supra Tables 1a, 1b, 2.
148. Over the next 15 years, population growth in the region will require the addition of
approximately 100 million new jobs. See Ray Takeyh, Close, but No Democracy, NAT’L INT.,
Winter 2004/05, at 57.
149. Joe Stephens and David B. Ottoway, A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 2005, at A01 (discussing the deteriorating structures and institutions in Afghanistan
that were rushed to completion by the U.S. prior to national elections).
150. See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 47, at 53.
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development will encourage long-term growth, ensure local
collaboration, and engage international support.
Finally, immediate attention must be given to long-term
sustainable development in the Middle East and Africa. These two
regions are the poorest, most underdeveloped in the world and they
have shown themselves to be economically, politically and socially
151
incapable of meeting the needs of their citizens. The result has been
the proliferation of Middle Eastern puppet-governments with little
domestic legitimacy,152 and corrupt, militaristic African polities.153 The
United States is the most prominent actor in the Middle East and thus
is a primary target of terrorist attacks against the West. Accordingly,
it is in the best interests of the American people for the United States
to pursue a policy of preventive development—to bring the growth
and peace to the people before they bring the war and hatred to
America.
“[D]emocracy is the worst form of government except for all
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”154 Winston
Churchill saw the drawbacks of democratic rule but recognized that it
155
Promoting democratic
is the most workable system of our time.
values is wise foreign policy for democratic countries. What needs to
be remembered, however, is that democratic values alone do not
bring growth, peace or sustainability. Promoting democracy must
encompass the promotion of development. When key development
indicators fail, democracy will fail. Democracy has been advocated as
the bringer of many goods—rapid economic growth, market
development, free and fair elections, equality—yet when these
deliverables fall short, support for democracies wanes and alternative
political and economic solutions are sought. Without successful
sustainable development practices and the acknowledgement that
development is a long-term process, democratic progress cannot be
sustained.

151. While many studies identify Sub-Saharan Africa as the poorest region in the world, the
adjusted net savings rate identified above indicates that the Middle East is even less endowed
with capital wealth. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., ZAKARIA, supra note 19, at 136.
153. See, e.g., Ernest Harsch, Africans Taking Action on Corruption, AFRICA RECOVERY,
July 1997, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol11no1/corrupt.htm; see also
Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1307 (2004).
154. Winston Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON
CHURCHILL, HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963 at 7566 (Robert Rhodes Jones ed., 1974).
155. See id.

